Good or bad credits from European sources?:Europe's financial credibility is bettere than populist credits for wood combustion by Czeskleba-Dupont, Rolf
Roskilde
University
Good or bad credits from European sources?





Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Czeskleba-Dupont, R. (2010). Good or bad credits from European sources? Europe's financial credibility is
bettere than populist credits for wood combustion. Paper presented at Alternative Economic Policy in Europe,
Bruxelles, Belgium. http://www.euromemo.de
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 27. Mar. 2021
Good or bad credits from European sources? Europe's financial 
credibility is better than populist credits for wood combustion¤)
Rolf Czeskleba-Dupont, Ph.D., M.Sc.
 Social Science Basic Studies
Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark
ABSTRACT
The paper gives an example regarding the manner, how economical and ecological arguments can 
be brought together in order 
(1) to reject the populist legitimation of the assault of the financial sector on European 
governance arguing with inevitable tax transfers, and
(2) to remind upon alternatives regarding  
(a) possible use of existing, but underused and underestimated EU credit institutions. This 
institutional acheology is taken from the historical and actual contribution of economist and 
historian Stuart Holland to thinking about European governance to overcome its flaws;
(b) problematic green technologies and ressource uses which should not be credited to be part of the 
transition to renewables. This argument is developed from a critique of Danish policies as seen from 
the view of grass roots and scientists cooperating to restrain the backward step from fine-tuned 
fossil fuel use in dense settlements to noxious applications  of more polluting, less energy efficient 
and actually also more CO2-emitting forms of combustion of biomass. An accounting model used 
by the State administration of Massachussetts for discussing time-profiles for renewable forestry 
and wood combustion substituting the combustion of  fossil fuels will be discussed. A perspective 
of likely impacts of climate change on forests is added in order to counteract the timeless 'truth' of 
'CO2-neutrality' as  applied to the combustion of forest products leading to wrong incentives and 
and to investments into false renewables. 
1. RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE OF A NEW DEAL DEBT ACCOUNTING MODEL
When drafting a Constitution of Europe, former French president Giscard d'Estaing did not see any 
meaning in describing the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in other than archival terms: 
”The draft Constitution left reference to the role of the EIB under ‘Other Institutions’ some  
hundred pages later after a section stressing the independence of the European Central Bank  
and neglecting to stress that the European Council can set guidelines for economic policy that it  
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is Treaty bound to support. Until its very last draft only weeks before publication the text on the  
EIB had been lifted without amendment extant from the Rome Treaty, even being in the future  
tense since in 1957 when the Treaty was signed, a European Investment Bank did not yet exist.  
No recognition was made that it had a remit following the Amsterdam Special Action Programme  
and the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils to invest in health, education, urban  
renewal and the environment, or to promote new technology and innovation.” (Holland 2010b, 
13). 
The proportional role of the EIB in international loan-giving – in 2008 it emitted ten times more 
international loans than the World Bank (Holland 2010c) – has also seldom been recognized.  The 
existence since the 1990s of  a European Investment Fund (EIF) has completely been neglected. 
Together with the EIB, it could otherwise be used to make the EU an example of what Stuart 
Holland proposed as a regionalised Bretton Woods financial architecture for a multi-polar world 
(Holland 1994). 
Even in political science, the EIB is a neglected theme, as Nick Robinson recently has brought into 
discussion, comparing it with the earlier fate of the European Court of Justice, which went 
unnoticed quite a time after its establishment (Robinson 2009). With 70 bn. Euro today (Holland 
2010b, 10) the EIBs volume of annual loans lies almost in the same order of magnitude as the 
financial aids thrown after failing banks in recent years – with the difference that the EIB is an 
example of better accountancy.
The irony of world history is, however, that – instead of using the rational potential of European 
institutions - a new construction of a European Monetary Fund is presently discussed in terms of 
restrictions akin to what already was contained in the original Stability and Growth Pact of 1997. As 
Jesper Jespersen of Roskilde University has argued (Jespersen 2010), this is a clear case of 
monetarist domination of the institutions of the Monetary Union. Indeed, a spirit of axiomatic 
dogmatism has shown its head in crucial moments of history - as e.g. in December 1993 at the Eco-
Fin council meeting in Edinburgh, when German finance minister Egon Waigel first rejected the 
idea of issuing Euro-bonds with the short-sighted argument that it would be counterproductive to 
allow the EU an expansionary financial policy at the same time, when member states should live up 
to the restrictive criteria of the Maastricht treaty. Monetarists and their political adherents 
apparently don't fear the deflationary effects of cutting public expenditure, when it comes to 
national debt exceeding 60% of GDP or continued periods with more than 3% budget deficit. After 
the recent financial breakdown and huge expenditures to bail out the banks, the practical wisdom 
31-08-10 2
not to implement the draconic sanctions implied in the Growth and Stability Pact of 1997, 
apparently is overrided by an extra impetus to reinforce them in practice. 
Monetarists simply ignore the knowledge on regional disparities, which since the 1970s has been 
accumulated in the literature on Western Europe (see e.g. Hugh Clout 1975, 1976) and which has 
assumed new dimensions with each round of enlargements until now, where 500 million inhabitants 
are registered as inhabitants of the EU. Already at the foundation of the European Community this 
market fundamentalist attitude was outspoken in the assumption that regional disparities (as well as 
unemployment) only are transitional phenomena, because the market with an inherent central 
tendency to equilibrium will regularly work for narrowing divergences. The respect for regional 
disparities was so limited that the establishment of the European Investment Bank with its remit to 
”provide loans to help the 'balanced and smooth development of the Common Market'” (Clout 
1976, 12; note the euphemism worth of Chinese diplomacy) only found its way into a protocol to 
the Rome Treaty: ”It thereby had not been headlined that while the Union itself could not borrow, 
its investment bank could” (Holland 2010c, 8) which encouraged the perception that anything 
financed by EEC/EU was taken from taxpayers rather than, as in the US New Deal, could shift 
savings into investments.
 
On the advice of Stuart Holland, whose report of 1993 to the Delors Commission on economic and 
social cohesion clearly demonstrated his understanding of spatial dynamics within the Community, 
the Delors presidency was then clear to use Euro bonds as the financial instrument for investments 
of common interest for both widening and deepening integration. For productive investments 
restructuring the economic landscape of Europe, the creditworthiness of the EU Commission and 
the member states in combination might be used - with high power to attract cofinancing on markets 
(leverage), low rent levels and a minimum of tax payer money – to finance investments from capital 
markets and, thus, to convert private savings into public regional and local improvements. 
The problem of economic and social cohesion in Europe could have been eased in this way, because 
an essential part of those socially and politically prioritised investments could have been financed 
by low-rent loans from the EIB and EIF -  without necessarily posting the costs on national 
accounts. This model of financing investments of common interest would not have implied 
financing via national tax increases, as Helmuth Kohl argued at a meeting of the European Council 
in 1995 (Holland 2010b, 9). In 1997, even chancellor Kohl dropped his resistance against Euro 
bonds and opened, thus, the way to use the EIB for investments in health, education, urban renewal, 
31-08-10 3
the urban environment and technology and innovation (Holland 2010b, 9).  If this would have been 
done earlier, the costs of German re-integration of East and West could have been offset for 
Germany itself (Holland 1993).
That the costs of  investments of common interest  would not count on the national debt of member 
states is a way of accounting which president Roosevelt introduced in 1933, when he let the U.S. 
Treasury issue bonds for federal investments which would not count on state budgets of say 
California or Massachussetts (Holland 2010a,b). To find an equivalent mechanism, Europe does not 
need further steps of integration. It only needs a decision by the European Council to set aside the 
actually restrictive EIB rule of member state co-financing – which would be appropriate given the 
seriousness of the present crisis. The European Central Bank is obliged not only to respect or take 
account of such guidlines but to support any 'broad guildelines of economic policy' agreed by the 
European Council by the terms of its constitution, modelled on that of the Bundesbank. It provides 
that, without prejudice to safeguarding the internal and external stability of the currency, it should 
support the ’general economic policies of the Union’. At the present and for the forseeable future, 
there is no risk of inflation but the risk of a weakening of the Euro - if governments do not show 
that they can strengthen the Eurozone by making a reality of their nominal comitment to a European 
Economic Recovery programme and issue the Union Bonds proposed by Jacques Delors. They 
could thereby attract purchases by surplus emerging economies and hedge funds. While the ECB 
would continue to be ”the guardian of stability, the European Investmant Bank could safeguard 
employment and sustainable growth” (Holland 2010 b, 14). 
In the dominating answer to the financial crisis since 2008 - to bail out the banks -, sustained credit 
is, however, given to democratically not legitimated Credit Rating Agencies which were some of 
the worst culprits of crisis provoking financial manipulations on the biggest scale – and they are 
now allowed to decide upon the amount of credit given to elected EU member state governments. 
This could change, if a politics based upon 'insight and cautiousness' (German: Ein- und Vorsicht) 
came into high gear in Europe - central codes already in 1864 articulated by Karl Marx for what he 
called the political economy of the working class – in contrast to the political economy of the 
bourgoisie which superficially focusses upon supply and demand, leaving the sphere of production 
behind the wall of private property (Marx 1864/1975). The social basis for a political economy of 
insight and cautiousness has to be reconstructed today from what is left of the workers movement 
and new social movements, especially in the fight against neoliberalist globalisation and its 
combined social and ecological catastrophies. Regarding the latter, the precautionary principle of 
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environmental politics has been sidestepped by rhetorical whitewash or by its conversion into 
'preemptive' military strikes. This implies a new importance of pluri-dimensional knowledge 
systems on peace and environment and the need of empowerment of local knowledge to fight 
wrong solutions for material problems. A case in point is the widespread ”accounting error” 
(Searchinger et al. 2009) of declaring combustion of all biomass for CO2-neutral, irrespective of the 
space and time dimensions of real plant growth in different ecological systems.
2. OPPOSING CLIMATE TO ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
In the global centers of fossil-based capital accumulation human neighborhoods have been 
constructed as more or less densely built-up areas - often with remote nodes of infrastructure for 
supplies of electricity and/or heat. The replacement of these infrastructures by on-the-spot heating 
equipment fuelled with stem wood or wood residues from forests means introducing seemingly 
well-known, but – as is known today – indeed highly toxic equipment. When this process gains 
momentum as part of policies to substitute fossil fuels and when it is extended by wood fuel use in 
big scale energy production, both the forest resource base, which often expanded in times of fossil 
fuel use (RCD 2009a), and public health are threatened. 
Health effects of wood combustion are mostly documented from peripheral countries with open-fire 
wood stoves. But there exists also a body of critical literature on the noxious qualities of wood 
smoke when released from Your neighbor's chimney, including substantial pollution by particles 
(even of the finest, most noxious grade), tar (PAH) carcinogens  and chlorinated dioxins reinforcing 
them, to name only a few toxic agents. The spectrum is similar to that of cigarette smoke with more 
dioxin production added from catalytic processes in chimneys  - as in Municipal Solid Waste 
Incinerators (R.C.-Dupont 2009b). 
In the last decade, however, regulatory power e.g. in the state of Denmark has been so reduced in 
the field of environmental controls, that emergent research on the matter of pollution from wood 
stoves has been shredded with flawed arguments from climate policy, before its critical results were 
discussed publicly. A critical example of this is furnished by former Danish minister of the 
environment, now EU Commissioner of the Environment, Connie Hedegaard. In 2006, Hedegaard 
underwrote the Danish National Report to the Stockholm Convention (on phasing out persistant 
organic pollutants, POPs, as e.g. dioxins). Here, some of the world's leading dioxin specialists 
(regarding small firing applications) had recommended to stop wood stoves without cleansing 
equipment in order to cure the dioxin problem: They were undercut by outspoken censorship 
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proposing in the same sentence that such a regulation, however, would counteract the Danish 
government's goals in climate policy, i.e. to reduce green house gases by 'carbon-neutral' wood 
combustion even in small, noxious appliances without flue gas cleansing. Several government 
agencies had revised emission factors of CO2 for wood smoke from being bigger than those of 
fossil fuels to be zero (R.C.-Dupont 2009b).  
The real world result according to series of measurements, reported by the Danish National 
Environmental Research Institute to international conventions: Danish emissions of dioxin are now 
up to levels of the first part of the 1990's, when emissions to air from MSWIs because of EU 
regulations began to be reduced and converted into toxic waste piles (exported as 'mine 
stabilisators'). The emissions of dioxins from neighbors' wood stoves have both experimentally and 
in dense settlement field work been measured as being in the same order of magnitude as the EU 
limit value for MSWIs - with their much higher chimney outlets, calculated to dilute dioxin air 
concentrations by a factor of 1000. No responsible authority should evade the issue of public health, 
which these and similar toxic emission concentrations in wood smoke pose. Based upon clinical 
knowledge, the Danish Society of Engineers (IDA) has, thus, estimated that public health could be 
essentially improved, if wood stoves were mostly outphased in a country like Denmark – leading to 
cut-backs in medical treatment costs in the order of magnitude of half a bn. Euro or nearly 1000 
Euro pr. wood stove (IDA 2009). 
There has also been emitted more CO2 from home heating than it would have been done by 
applying wiser heating technologies and/or better ways of passive solar 'heat storage'. This is, 
however, concealed by creative book-keeping, saying that an emission factor of zero is applied for 
air emissions of CO2 from the combustion of all biomass as a special ”effective emission factor” - a 
creative political construct (Illerup 2009). 
This 'effective' emission factor of zero does not exist in physical reality on the spot, but is only 
effective by virtue of a compensating factor thought to be at work in other places (in the global 
forests) and all into a distant future (through decades and centuries). An expected future 'income' of 
compensating photosynthetic activity reducing CO2 to combustible carbon stored in plant matter is 
discounted back into a 100% present value – without any deductions for uncertainty - if the project 
perspective is not completely ruled out by a simple, metaphysical adage saying that the combustion 
of biomass is CO2-neutral, because it only emits the same amount of CO2, as plant growth has 
bound previously (which also applies for fossil fuels). But, as physicist Bent Sørensen has written in 
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his seminal work on “Renewable Energy”, there is an important exception to the rule of CO2-
neutrality for the combustion of biomass: “the time lag for trees may be decades or centuries, and in 
such case the temporary carbon dioxide imbalance may contribute to climatic alterations.”(Sørensen 
2000, 477, italics rcd) 
Today, more knowledge has been accumulated to know that the combustion of stem wood is not 
part of a solution, but part of the global warming problem itself. It is acknowledged that around 
20% of global CO2 emissions are caused by burning tree – usually allocated to tropical forests. But 
regarding the enhanced greenhouse effect, it makes no sense to distinguish this CO2 from that 
emitted by chimneys in temperate climate zones from many small dispersed appliances or from 
more concentrated wood burning facilities producing electricity and/or heat.
The said 'effective emission factor' of zero for wood combustion can, thus, only be the result of a 
nullifying hypothesis which has been criticised as part of “The Carbon Neutral Myth”, when tree 
planting projects were offered by offset companies as a means to compensate for personal carbon 
debt: 
“The reason why the offset companies can argue for carbon neutrality is they are using a carbon  
calculation method that is best termed 'future value accounting'. Carbon savings expected to be  
made in the future are counted as savings made in the present... Each time someone offsets their  
emissions, the amount of CO2 emitted is automatically in the atmosphere, whereas the period of  
'neutralisation' takes place over a much-longer time period, sometimes 100 years” (Smith 2007, 
24). 
In the following, this idea is substantiated by talking about the ecological debt of CO2-emissions 
(inclusive equivalent emissions of other greenhouse gases, for simplicity altogether called CO2) as 
analogous to financial debt; and the repayment of this debt through future photosynthetic activity in 
form of forest growth, called CO2 dividends. By this way, we dissolve the zero emission claim 
analytically into its constituent processes and make better accountancy possible.
3. CO2 DEBT FROM WOOD COMBUSTION AND ITS EVENTUAL REPAYMENT BY 
CARBON DIVIDENDS
Against the promise of the British Carbon Neutral Company (former: Future Forests) to “ensure that 
woodlands (to be invested in, rcd) are created and well-managed over a minimum of 99 years” 
Smith argues: “The fact that the trees are supposed to absorb the carbon over a period of 99 years  
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also raises a serious issue over timing. Many climate scientists have emphasised that the next  
decade is a critical period for emissions reductions, if we are to avoid crossing a threshold of  
global temperature increase that would create feedback loops amplifying the impact of climate  
change.” (Smith 2007, 22).  This is only one, but politically the most dramatical aspect of the time 
problem dealing with irreversible, historical time. I will come back to this issue.
Another aspect of the time issue in the sense of reversible (or: ergodic) time is at stake, when 
evaluating at project level, whether or rather: when the break-even point for carbon neutrality is 
reached during the working period of a harvested-wood-to-energy-project, based upon the 
substitution of wood for fossil fuels in different types of combustion systems. Such a differentiated 
approach has been modelled by the Center for Conservation Sciences at Manomet/Massachussetts 
(Manomet 2010) for the Dept. of Energy Resources (DOER) of the Commonwealth of 
Massachussetts. Upon receipt of the report “Biomass sustainability and carbon policy study” the 
state's Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs Ian Bowles said in an enabling letter of July, 
7 to DOER Commissioner Philip Giudice now to “have a deeper understanding that the  
greenhouse gas impacts of biomass energy are far more complicated than the conventional view  
that electricity from power plants using biomass harvested form New England natural forests is  
carbon neutral”. Despite remaining uncertainties, Bowles was “confident that we now have enough 
information for DOER to take the next step in changing the way in which the Commonwealth 
provides incentives for biomass energy.” (Bowles 2010) He also was “thankful to the Manomet 
researcheres as well as the many scientists, stakeholders and concerned citizens who have helped us 
to clarify the complex issues surrounding biomass power and greenhouse gas emissions”.
The authors of the Manomet/NCI report themselves claim that the “framework and approach we 
have developed for assessing the impacts of wood biomass energy have wide applicability for other 
regions and countries” (Manomet 2010, 6). It is, therefore, worth wile to discuss both the formal 
framework and some of the assumptions made in the substantial approach of the study, which are 
reflected in its conclusions. Another, critical source has started the discussion of the science behind 
the Manomet biomass report and the validity of its main conclusions concerning net carbon 
emissions from biomass energy, relative to fossil fuels (Booth 2010). I draw upon this critique, 
because it proceeds in an immanent way based upon the premises of the Manomet study.  Own 
extensions are made from this point of departure. To start with, I will, however, shortly recapitulate 
basic science informations on the relative amount of CO2 released extra, when biomass fuels, 
especially: wood, are substituted for fossil fuels. These are minimum amounts of the real carbon 
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debt incurred by such substitution, being generically caused by the fuel switch as such  – and not 
other, more complicated factors of technology.
 Table 1. CO2 emissions pr. unit of energy produced from combustion of three fossil fuels and  
from wood  - absolute and percentage change when switching fuel source
Source: J.Fenhann, N.A. Kilde 1994: Inventory of emissions from Danish sources, 1972-1992
The Manomet report recalls this fact in its Executive Summary simply by stating: “Forest biomass 
generally emits more greenhouse gases than fossil fuels per unit of energy produced. We define 
these excess emissions as the biomass carbon debt.” (Manomet 2010, 6). The main text contains, 
however, no quantitative data on how big the difference is, depending upon which fossil fuel is 
substituted. The term 'more greenhouse gases' could even be misunderstood as meaning 
qualitatively different types of these gases. At any rate, the basic science is omitted, although it is 
said: “The initial level of carbon debt is an important determinant of the desirability of producing 
energy from forest biomass.”(loc.cit.)- At a more complex level of project evaluation, the study 
states: “The atmospheric greenhouse gas implications of burning forest biomass for energy vary 
depending upon the characteristics of the bioenergy combustion technology, the fossil fuel  
technology it replaces and the biophysical and forest management characteristics of the forests  
from which the biomass is harvested.” 
In this paper, I will not deal with the combustion technologies applied, because it is questionable, 
whether efficiency assessments based upon 1.law efficiency are meaningful, when comparing 
heating plants with combined heat and power production. Regarding forests, their regeneration and 
continued exploitability is often taken for granted – as a gift of nature, perhaps supported by 
certification. In the Manomet study it is spelled out as a mere potential reduction factor to be 
weighed against the carbon debt which inevitably occurs when shifting fuel. Regrowth of the 
harvested forest, it says, “removes this carbon from the atmosphere, reducing the carbon debt. After 
the point at which the debt is paid off, biomass begins to yield carbon dividends in the form of  
atmospheric greenhouse gas levels that are lower than would have occurred from the use of fossil 
fuels to produce the same amount of energy.”  Pointing at the figure below, a global hint is added: 
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FUEL  from  natural gas      gas oil         coal         wood
57 74 95 102 [kg CO2 absolute
to per GJ]
nat. Gas -23 -40 -44 %-change
gas oil 30 -22 -27 with
coal 67 28 -7 switch of
wood 79 38 7 fuel
“The full recovery of the biomass carbon debt and the magnitude of the carbon dividend benefits 
also depend on future forest management actions (or inaction, rcd) and natural disturbance events 
allowing that recovery to occur” (loc.cit.). Natural disturbance is not seen as a long term problem, 
e.g. in climate connection with unsustainable levels of global warming, but only in terms of a 
history of weather 'events'. This must be seen in the light of the policy targets, which 
Massachussetts has set itself (together with other North-Eastern States), namely to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 10-25% in 2020 and by 80% in 2050. So, a span of at least 40 years 
has to be reckoned with, and here, the still rising curve of global GHG emissions has direct 
implications for forest development, making the question of a turning point very decisive, see 
below.
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Fig. 1 (tonnes of carbon) Schematic view upon initial carbon debt and its repayment in the form of 
carbon dividends over a century; from: Manomet 2010, Exec.Summary, p.6. Note: upper horisontal 
axis = Year after cutting (break even at year 32)
As Booth 2010 makes explicit, this figure shows the biomass carbon debt relative to (constant) 
carbon emissions from fossil fuel use – yet only for forest cutting from a single year. The carbon 
dividend shown is provided “only for a single year's worth of cutting on a particular harvested area” 
(a single acre of land). This does not describe the integrated picture of carbon emissions from a 
biomass facility, “which operates continuously over many years and requires new forest to be cut  
every year. The integrated picture is more complex and can be drawn as a series of  
supplementary curves, one for each year of cutting.”  See fig.2.     
Fig. 2. Extended version of the Manomet study plot for carbon recovery with successively more 
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acres of forest area exploited for continuous biomass combustion operations. (stipled curves in 5 
year intervals). Source: Booth 2010, p.9 
As written in the figure text, total carbon outstanding at year 32 after 7 'cuttings' is still negative at 
nearly 150% of emissions from fossil fuels producing the same amount of energy. No comparable 
calculations or even a hint at the result - postponing the break even point between biomass and 
fossil fuel emissions - are given in the Manomet study. Some short supplementary remarks are, as 
Booth argues, not sufficient to compensate for a tendency in the study to make results look more 
favourable for biomass projects than is warranted by the otherwise more complex logic of the 
model construction.
A crucial assumption in model construction, which Booth 2010 does not challenge, is, however, 
contained in the forest growth model itself. The Manomet study presupposes that a heavier removal 
on an area cut for biomass, compared to the same area only being cut for timber, increases the 
growth rate in the recovering forest, so that the difference in total stand carbon in the course of a 
century is reduced to zero or even turned into an increase. See fig. 3.
Fig.3. Total stand carbon (vertical axis) and carbon recovery times (tonnes carbon)
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The validity of this model assumption will depend upon site-specific factors, partly of biophysical 
nature in the ecosystem concerned, partly the forest management strategies chosen. The model 
presupposes that the acre is not re-cut before full carbon recovery. This is one of the assumptions 
Booth criticises as lacking realism – not the least because this non-intervention is difficult to 
control. 
Methodologically, the Manomet study has reframed and broadened the CO2-neutrality question in 
'incremental terms' (Manomet 2010, 99):
A  limit of this incrementalist approach can be seen, however, in the cited assumption that a heavier 
removal on an area cut for biomass, compared to the same area only being cut for timber, 
continuously increases the growth rate in the recovering forest. This linear trend must meet its 
asymptote, because  foresters have not yet learned the art of making trees grow into heaven. On the 
contrary, Schlamadinger et al. 1999 have pointed at a limit in carbon density of a forest which 
when transgressed makes any hope ever to recover the carbon debt incurred by the initial cut 
unrealistic, especially when realising that future benefits because of their inherent insecurity have to 
be discounted appropriately. Applying a 4% discount rate, which emphasizes the short term GHG 
debt, the limit in stand density becomes crucial: “There is no gain at all in terms of net present 
value of C to harvest forests with an initial C storage greater than about 150 MgC ha-1.” 
(Schlamadinger et al. 1999, 323). This is said here only to make the argument that there is an 
absolute limit.
The necessity of prioritising short term versus long term effects is made clear in the Manomet study, 
but is not explored e.g. by applying different discount rates. A short remark is stating the obvious: 
“The higher the discount rate – indicative of a greater preference for lower GHG levels in the near 
term, the longer the time to reach the point of fully-offset damages.” (Manomet 2010, 99) The 
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trade-off between near term damages and long term benefits is turned over to the politicians to 
decide upon, but the study itself does not give an unbiased picture of, how the cross-over from short 
term damage to long term benefit can be expected to occur in reality – how long periods of 
indifference may be. It rather suggests, that what might be a longer period of transition with 
ambivalent results, in fact would be a single point in time.
A series of further assumptions has been highlighted by the critique of Booth 2010 as giving an 
illusionary picture that the break-even point is nearer than it might be in reality, see App.1. 
As combined effect of these assumptions Booth resumes (2010, 4): 
In 1999, Schlamadinger and Marland proposed another consequence at a more direct level than 
state regulation, namely to place the burden of proof on the side of project makers: “Any intent to 
use forest harvesting to help mitigate the build-up of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere will  
have to demonstrate that the forest regrowth and product use can compensate for any loss from 
the forest stand as a result of the initial harvest.” (Schlamadinger and Marland 1999, 324) 
This turns the burden of proof from the side of scientists and citizen groups, who in North America 
have begun to intervene in the political process (see e.g. Sheehan and Schlossberg 2010, editors of 
'Biomass Busters' news). The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and national/regional 
implementations of its rules on land use, land use change and forestry have in countries that have 
ratified it led to  general clauses of calculating CO2 emissions from all kinds of biomass as virtually 
non-existent (Johnson 2008), e.g. in the Danish Law on CO2 quotas from 2004, as amended in 
2008. It is an irony of world-history that the non-ratifying countries might be quicker to recognise 
and perhaps correct the fatal flaw of carbon accounting with unconditional zero emissions for all 
biomass combustion.
4. POLITICALLY PROMULGATED CO2 ACCOUNTING ERRORS AND PROPOSALS TO 
FIX THEM
Before the Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP 15) Searchinger et al. published an article in 
Science, where they in relation to EU cap and trade rules and the climate bill passed by the U.S. 
House of Representatives in early 2009 argued that emissions from the use of bioenergy have to be 
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accounted for – either at the output side as emissions from smokestacks and tailpipes or at the input 
side into the technosphere, when land-use is changed by clear-cutting forest areas:
 
Source: Searchinger et al. 2009
In the same vein, Johnson 2009 pointed at the painful, but necessary learning process, whereby 
accounting and standards for liquid biofuels were changed from automatically presupposing carbon-
neutrality to accounting for land-use change, i.e. deforestation. ”But it is partially or completely 
missing from standards for footprinting and LCA (life cycle analysis, rcd) of solid fuels”. (Johnson 
2009, 165) He also gives an overview regarding international institutions which have adopted the 
easy way of calling the combustion of all kinds of biomass for CO2-neutral, although e.g. the 
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classical text of Bent Sørensen on 'Renewable Energy' (2nd ed. 2000, p. 477, italics rcd) clearly 
stated:  “Concerning carbon dioxide, which accumulates in the atmosphere as a consequence of 
rapid combustion of fossil fuels, it should be kept in mind that the carbon dioxide emissions during 
biomass combustion are balanced in magnitude by the net carbon dioxide assimilation in the plants, 
so that the atmospheric CO2 content is not affected, at least by the use of biomass crops in fast 
rotation” as e.g. yearly energy plants. “However”, as Sørensen underlines, “the time lag for trees  
may be decades or centuries, and in such case the temporary carbon dioxide imbalance (between 
CO2-emission by actual combustion and the eventual binding of the same amount of CO2 by 
additional photosynthetic activity, rcd) may contribute to climatic alterations.”
Before the Manomet report was issued (June 2010), some of the members of the Searchinger group 
actually wrote a letter to Congress in order to stop the menacing fixation into law, what already has 
been adopted as such in Europe:
Source: William H.Schlesinger  (U.S. Academy of Sciences), Letter to Congress, May, 17 2010, 
subscribed by 90 scientists.
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5. FORESTS AS TIPPING POINTS UNDER MODERATE GLOBAL WARMING
There are good reasons, why forest normalcy is a goal worth of protecting (social 
multifunctionality, livelihood, maintenance of the infrastructure of infrastructures, Daly). As IPCC 
research under the lead author Andreas Fischlin (Fischlin et al. 2007) has demonstrated, forests will, 
however, with high probability already under moderate global warming (from 2,5 degrees C above 
pre-industrial level upwards) globally change from a function of being net CO2 sinks to that of net 
CO2 sources. After the fatal failure of COP15 at Copenhagen this degree of global warming is 
expected to occur as a lower estimate, if more radical changes as those proposed by the March 2010 
peoples' climate summit at Cochabamba/Bolivia (www.cmpcc.org) - and by KlimaForum 09 in 
Copenhagen under the slogan 'System change, not climate change' - don't materialise.
The threat of forests turning into sources of additional CO2 to the atmosphere was in early 2009 
made public by the International Union of Forest Research Organisations (Buck et al.2009). It was 
also discussed within the COP 15 side event ”Forest Day 3”. Here, a representative of the European 
wood industry declared that all this stuff only was theory. He knew that EU regulations as a follow-
up of the Marrakesh Accords of 2001 on operationalising the Kytoto Protocol on Land Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry did not make any discrimination between plant matter grown in short 
rotation as e.g. straw and plant matter growing over many years, decades or even centuries as stem 
tree, see the above quotation from 'Renewable Energy'  by physicist Bent Sørensen, where he 
warned against possible impacts of a time-lag upon global warming. As Sørensen recently spelled 
out in a short debate with the Searchinger group in Science, the practically decisive question is now 
to avoid combustion to protect the global carbon balance: “What matters is, what is done with the  
wood from clearing. If combusted, this is a one-time, negative impact on the carbon balance. If 
the wood is used for house construction or furniture, the immediate impact is zero. There will be a 
negative impact only, if these items are later burnt.” (Sørensen 2010) And: Bigger positive effects in 
replacing fossil fuels are possible, when wood is re-substituted for materials, which the 
petrochemical industry and its up-stream linkages within the last 50-60 years have substituted for 
wood (Commoner 1990).
When everything is collapsed under the misleading title of 'biomass', the forest industry has, 
however, not only Kyoto-governments to set its faith into, but up till now also mighty financial 
institutions. They have long since accepted to give insurance for investments into conversions e.g. 
of big power plants from coal or even natural gas to biomass e.g. in the form of wood chips – 
whether the logo 'CO2-neutral' is added or not. 
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6. CREDITWORTHINESS IN QUESTION
The trustworthiness of financial institutions has in these years been questioned because of the 
emission of false credits and their derivatives with alleged security in real estate related income 
streams. The rosy, even harmonious picture of power industry changing from dirty coal to green 
fuel as wood chips may, however, become less rosy and eventually lead to the same awakening, 
because it is funded on bad science - not intentionally bad, but bad in its lack of realism to explain 
and govern the complexity of real world developments. At the macro ecological level, the fate of 
forests is as insecure as the fate of the American middle class in its human-ecological niche of 
suburbia, when peak oil is making itself felt (Heinberg 2005). The history of oil is one common root 
cause of this coincidence: More energy put into and staying in the atmosphere means higher 
probabilities of forest fire, more mobilisation of the C pool in soils (Karhu et al. 2010), more 
destabilisation of forest habitat for endogenous species (Kurz et al. 2008), forest destruction by 
invading species etc. 
So, it is at least equally, but probably more insecure to calculate with an expanded and sustained net 
CO2-assimilation power of the world's forests as it was at the roots of the last big financial crisis  to 
calculate with real estate rents based upon dwindling personal income streams.  Both ways of 
calculations have the assumption in common, that – non-human or human – living potentials – 
which can produce living matter with an increment of CO2-binding or commodities with a surplus 
value to be realised on capitalist markets – might be used indefinitely for the sake of surplus 
production – irrespective of comprehensive reproduction requirements at local and/or personal 
scale. The latter emerge in the form of limits to trends of commodity production in the sense of 
Wallerstein's asymptotes (Wallerstein 1991).
Discussing commodification versus decommodification in relation to carbon trading and carbon 
offsets Larry Lohmann has drawn the following parallel: ”Just as financial-sector quantism lost 
touch with the on-the-ground realities of mortgage holders in low-income neigh-bourhoods of US 
cities, so carbon-sector quantism distances itself from the social or biophysical realities of  
specific carbon offset projects.” (Lohmann 2010, 245) It may be said that the term 'CO2-neutrality' 
by introducing zero emissions for all biomass is only a short-hand term deducible from this 
'quantism'. In order to open it up for discussion based upon both local and technical knowledge on 
ecosphere and technosphere interactions, including human health, the Manomet study approach has 
a useful form. Regarding the content of its many parameters, the critique raised by Booth 2010 has 
to be followed up in order to make the complexity of the issue better understandable and to ground 
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it on local/regional realities. 
A strategy of de-commodification has, at any rate, to restrict the trend that the dynamics of financial 
markets spill over into  projects of substituting fossil fuels. As testified by Friends of the Earth in 
the U.S. legislative process on carbon trading: “'Subprime carbon' -- called 'junk carbon' by traders 
-- are contracts to deliver carbon that carry a higher risk of not being fulfilled, and thus may  
collapse in value. They are comparable to subprime loans or junk bonds, debts that carry a higher 
probability of not being paid. Carbon offset credits (credits derived from projects designed to  
reduce greenhouse gases) can carry particularly high risks because many things can go wrong  
with offset projects. Not only do such projects face normal commercial and operational risks, but  
independent verifiers may find that a project has not reduced the projected amount of emissions,  
for example; or an agency issuing credits (e.g. United Nations) may determine that a project  
failed to comply with relevant standards. Subprime carbon particularly can become a problem 
because sellers can make promises ahead of time to deliver carbon credits before the credits are 
issued, or sometimes even before greenhouse gas emissions have been verified.” (Friends of the 
Earth 2009, see also Chan 2009).
CONCLUSION 
In the above discussion of a regionalized context of project evaluation as presented by the example 
of Manomet/Massachussetts, the burden of proof will have to rest upon project proponents showing 
that it is achievable in reasonable time scales to offset the same project's carbon debt. Public 
information must document this in a transparent manner, before official approval is given.  It is 
increasingly urgent to apply a discount factor on future carbon dividends that are too insecure, as 
originally shown by Schlamadinger and Marland 1999. This is so,  because the future carbon 
reduction capacity of global forests is at odds. Such calculations should be made public for any 
projects where the present value of a carbon debt is offset by carbon dividens from living matter 
that only accrue after more than a few years. As the European Presidency of the Brussels European 
Council (8/9 March 2007) underlined in its conclusions: ”30. The European Council reaffirms that 
absolute emission reduction commitments are the backbone of a global carbon market.”(Council 
2007) If this commitment is to be realised regionally, absolute emission reductions should count as 
the backbone of any single project. Project planning should be scrutinised accordingly. The 
European Investment Bank and/or Fund should be made responsible to do this in transparent 
ways. - It is possible to find paths of a more regular and solidaric 'green' investment strategy than 
markets alone can secure. But this is surely not done by governments throwing money after the 
banks, pressing austerity policies on the heads of people and in case of doubt reducing investments 
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in ecologically appropriate technologies as e.g. enhanced wind power (Skouboe 2010).  They will 
rather continue to combine disrespect regarding institutional credit policy potentials at European 
level with populist credits for such morally dubious techniques as local wood stoves in densly built-
up areas.
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App. I. PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE MANOMET REPORT (Booth 2010)
1. Large trees are used for biomass fuel.
Because forest regrowth rates in the model are to a large extent a function of the 
intensity of harvest (with heavier harvests of larger, older trees opening up more 
space for regrowth to occur), the model achieves maximal regrowth and 
resequestration of carbon released by biomass burning by assuming that 
relativelylarge, old trees are logged for biomass. However, this is not representative of 
actual biomass harvesting, which is more likely to remove low‐diameter, low‐value 
material. Actual regrowth rates of forests where low‐diameter material is removed will 
be much slower than modeled.
2. Harvested forest stands must not be recut pending carbon 
sequestration. 
The model additionally requires that once a stand has been cut, it must not be re‐cut 
until it has achieved a large proportion of the amount of standing carbon in an 
unmanaged stand. The Manomet report itself acknowledges this is unlikely.
3. A high percentage of tops and limbs are used as fuel. 
Because the tops and limbs of trees harvested for timber under the BAU scenario are 
assumed to stay in the forest and rot, producing carbon, the model assumes almost no 
carbon penalty for collecting this material and burning it. The model assumes that 
65% of all tops and limbs generated on acres harvested for biomass can be removed 
from the forest for use as fuel, supplying a relatively large “low carbon” source of fuel 
in the model. Removal of this amount of tops and limbs appears to be necessary to 
achieving the transition from biomass carbon debt to carbon dividend in the model, 
but is not compatible with maintaining soil fertility and other forest ecological 
functions.
4. Biomass harvesting only occurs on land that is already being harvested 
for timber.
The study takes as its BAU assumption that when land is harvested for timber, all 
residues are left in the forest, whereas a portion is collected for fuel in the biomass 
scenario. The study draws no conclusions concerning carbon dynamics
and regrowth in forests cut solely for biomass. This assumption is necessary for 
generating the “low carbon” fuel source of tops and limbs from commercial timber 
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harvesting that is integral to calculating carbon dividends from biomass in a timely 
way. Land cut solely for biomass would take a much longer time to achieve a carbon 
dividend.
5. Soil carbon emissions are negligible. 
The soil carbon pool is extremely large, and a significant fraction of it is easily 
decomposed and evolved as CO2 when soils are disturbed by logging. However, the 
Manomet model completely disregards this source of emissions that are associated 
with biomass harvesting. This assumption is challenged by the author of a major 
review on soil carbon emissions cited, and dismissed, by the Manomet study.
6. Firewood harvesting is not impacted. 
Although indirect land use effects can be major sources of greenhouse gas emissions 
from biomass harvest, and although the RFP for the Manomet study requested that the 
study evaluate indirect land use effects, the study does not acknowledge that 
displacement of firewood harvest by biomass harvest could result in “leakage” of 
firewood harvesting and more forestland being cut for firewood.
7. Wood pellet manufacture incurs no more carbon debt than green chips. 
Although it is well‐established that manufacture of wood pellets requires 
significant inputs of green wood in excess of the heating value actually 
embodied in the pellets produced, as well as significant fossil fuel expenditures, 
the study treats wood pellets as embodying the same amount of carbon and 
energy as green wood chips.
8. Wood from landclearing incurs little carbon debt. 
The study concludes that woody biomass from non‐forestry sources, such as from 
land‐clearing, will not entail any greater greenhouse gas emissions than forestry wood. 
However, no modeling is conducted to substantiate this conclusion. The study also 
does not discuss how wood from land‐clearing can be considered eligible under 
requirements that biomass fuels be available on a renewable and recurring basis, as 
required under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
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